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Since the early 2010s, the climate diplomacy of the European Union (EU) has 
undergone considerable changes. Traditionally relying on a ‘leadership-by-example’ 
approach primarily concerned with the external projection of its domestic policies, the 
EU profoundly adapted its climate diplomacy strategy between the 2009 conference 
of the parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen and the 2015 Paris COP 21. This redefined 
strategy was further consolidated in the aftermath of the Paris COP. Key features of 
the EU’s redesigned climate diplomacy are its focus on stronger – cooperative and/or 
confrontational – bilateral relations with major emitters and a greater flexibility in its 
positions and actions. To better understand and explain this strategic turn, the paper 
provides a comparative analysis of the EU’s climate diplomacy vis-à-vis the three 
major emitters China, the United States and India during the negotiations on the 
Copenhagen Accord (2005-2009), on the Paris Agreement (2010-2015) and on the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement (2016-2020). It argues that the EU has 
embraced a strategy of ‘multiple bilateralism’, which aims to develop parallel bilateral 
relationships within the broader context of a multilateral negotiation setting. The 
Union’s strategic turn can be explained by the opening of a policy window resulting 
from the interplay between the changing geopolitics of climate change and 
conducive institutional developments within the EU, which was exploited by EU policy 
entrepreneurs. This turn enabled the EU to co-create a negotiation environment that 
facilitated the convergence of major emitters’ positions in the global climate 
negotiations at Paris. Sustaining such an enabling environment thus represents a 






Introduction: EU climate diplomacy as a site of foreign policy strategizing1 
 
Since the early 2010s, the climate diplomacy of the European Union (EU) has 
undergone considerable changes. Traditionally, the Union’s external climate action 
had relied on a ‘leadership-by-example’ approach primarily concerned with the 
global projection of its internal climate and energy policies, paired with often highly 
ambitious calls for top-down global climate governance under United Nations (UN) 
auspices (Van Schaik & Schunz, 2012; Oberthür & Roche-Kelly, 2008). After the failure 
of the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, this approach was fundamentally 
reconsidered. As a result, the EU profoundly adapted its climate diplomacy strategy 
between the conference of the parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen and the 2015 Paris 
COP 21. Its redefined strategy was further consolidated in the aftermath of the Paris 
summit, notably in reaction to the United States (US) government’s 2017 
announcement of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement (PA).  
 
When the EU re-designed its external climate strategy, adaptations were made 
especially to the ways it selected its main interlocutors and practically interacted with 
them. The Union clearly moved away from a singular focus on the multilateral arena 
and leadership-by-example to what can be termed ‘multiple bilateralism’ (MB), 
defined as a foreign policy “strategy that entails the maintenance of several bilateral 
relationships in parallel as a subset of a multilateral negotiation setting” (Belis et al., 
2018: 86). With this shift, the EU abandoned its attempts to create a global climate 
regime mirroring its own regional regime and adopted a more pragmatic approach 
acknowledging that it forms part of a broader and malleable global context, in which 
the – cooperative and/or confrontational – relations between major emitters are 
decisively shaping multilateral climate policies (Schunz, 2019). Key features of this re-
designed EU climate diplomacy are greater flexibility and a stronger investment into 
its multiple bilateral relations with other major emitters in parallel to the ongoing UN 
climate regime negotiations.  
 
This paper offers a better understanding and explanation of the observed 
transformation of the EU’s climate diplomacy. To do so, it first analyses how the EU’s 
climate diplomacy strategy vis-à-vis the key emitters China, the US and India has – in 
the broader context of the UN climate regime – evolved from (i) the negotiations on 
the Copenhagen Accord (2005-2009) to (ii) the negotiations on the Paris Agreement 
(2010-215) and (iii) those on the Paris Agreement’s implementation (2016-2020). 
Second, it offers an explanation of the EU’s strategic turn, exposing why the Union 
modified its strategy in the way it did.  
 
1 The author would like to thank David Belis for allowing him to pursue the work on this paper, which started 
out as a joint endeavour. 
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By addressing these two questions, the paper contributes to the ongoing academic 
and political debates about the EU’s role in global climate politics. The academic 
debate (see, e.g., von Lucke et al., 2021; Oberthür & Groen, 2018; Parker et al., 2017) 
has for two decades overly focused on the EU-centric question of whether the Union 
is a ‘leader’ in multilateral climate politics (Afionis, 2017; Wurzel et al., 2017; Oberthür & 
Roche Kelly, 2008; Gupta & Grubb, 2000). The post-Copenhagen context had seen a 
few novel perspectives emerge, which emphasized the EU’s alleged role as a 
‘leadiator’, that is, ‘leader-cum-mediator’ (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013) and paid 
some attention to its bilateral relations with emerging economies (Torney, 2015a). 
However, the multipolar dynamics of the negotiations on the Paris Agreement and its 
implementation further prompt a thorough rethink of scholarly analyses of the EU’s 
climate diplomacy. Importantly, these should involve a Foreign Policy Analysis 
perspective that transcends the focus on its alleged default ‘multilateral preference’.  
 
This is particularly relevant in the context of the EU’s overall ‘strategic turn’ emanating 
from its 2016 Global Strategy, which called for more flexible ways of engaging with the 
world, including the possibility for the EU to “partner selectively with players whose 
cooperation is necessary to ... address common challenges” (High Representative, 
2016: 12). Since 2019, this prospect has been even more forcefully articulated when 
the incoming European Commission under President von der Leyen expressed the 
desire for a ‘geopolitical Europe’. This ambition is promoted by the current EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) Borrell (2020) under the guise 
of pursuing EU ‘strategic autonomy’ through its external action, in areas ranging from 
defence and security matters to health and climate policies. In the words of Nathalie 
Tocci (2021: 8, 9), who was instrumental to drafting the EU Global Strategy and 
continues to advise the HR, such strategic autonomy entails that “in living by its laws, 
the EU aims to pursue its strategic interests” while “being a partner to an international 
order based upon rules it has contributed to shaping”. 
 
The conceptual debate about the EU’s strategic approach to pressing global matters 
is where the academic discussions meet the political debate. Politically, the Union’s 
revised climate diplomacy is not only a major test case for its desire and capacity to 
act strategically, but the precise way in which the EU strategically approaches global 
climate negotiations is also bound to play a major role in determining the effectiveness 
of its contribution to the PA implementation. This implementation is happening at a 
time when the EU has – with its new flagship initiative, the 2019 ‘European Green Deal’ 
– centred its policies on the PA goal of net-zero emissions by mid-century and vowed 
to “develop a stronger ‘green deal diplomacy’ focused on convincing and supporting 
others to take on their share” to achieve that aim (European Commission, 2019: 20). 
As this target can only be reached when all major emitters act in sync, the Union’s 
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strategy is likely to be of particular significance when it comes to re-engaging the 
United States under its new pro-climate action President Biden (Schunz, 2020). Better 
understanding and explaining this strategy allows then also for assessing its prospects 
in the newly unfolding global climate politics context, in the run-up to the November 
2021 COP 26 in Glasgow and beyond. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: after outlining the analytical framework, it engages in 
a comparative analysis of the EU’s climate diplomacy vis-à-vis China, the US and India 
during the periods 2005-2009, 2010-2015 and 2016-2020 to answer the first research 
question. It subsequently answers the second question by explaining the observed 
trends regarding the multiple bilateral dynamics with major emitters. The paper argues 
that the EU changed its strategy in reaction to a policy window opened by a change 
in the external ‘opportunity’ regarding global climate politics and its own reinforced 
domestic ‘presence’ following the Lisbon Treaty. This policy window was exploited by 
a coalition of long-standing EU climate diplomacy advocates and new policy 
entrepreneurs bringing in a foreign policy perspective. The paper concludes with a 
reflection on the research and policy implications of its findings. The EU’s turn to MB 
enabled it to co-create a negotiation environment that facilitated the convergence 
of major emitters’ positions in Paris. Sustaining such an enabling environment 





This section draws on insights from International Relations (IR) theories on the nature of 
the global climate regime and of Strategic Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis on the 
foreign policy strategies of actors in complex global political contexts to introduce the 
key concepts of the analytical framework guiding this study: global climate politics 
and ‘multiple bilateralism’ as one of several external engagement strategies at the 
EU’s disposal in its climate diplomacy. MB is then set into relation to the notion of 
‘strategic hedging’. 
 
At the heart of the broader ‘regime complex for climate change’ lies the UN climate 
regime (Keohane & Victor, 2011). While this multilateral arena has remained the chief 
site of global climate negotiations since the regime’s inception in the early 1990s, it has 
been common for major emitters to use ‘minilateral’ bodies, such as the G-7, G-8(+5), 
G-20 or the Major Economies Forum/Meeting of the top 17 emitters, alongside bilateral 
exchanges to prepare multilateral negotiation rounds. The endgame of the 1997 COP 
3 in Kyoto, for instance, involved last-minute ‘telephone diplomacy’, that is, bilateral 
exchanges between the leaders of key countries (Oberthür & Ott, 1999). Yet, for at 
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least two decades, such bilateral exchanges between individual parties had 
remained significantly less central to the overarching ‘regime complex’ than relations 
between the various negotiation coalitions in the UN regime, such as the ‘Umbrella 
Group’ around the US and the G-77/China of about 130 developing countries.  
 
Since the mid-2000s, this has markedly changed. The rise of the BASIC countries (Brazil, 
South Africa, India, China) and of their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions introduced 
multipolar tendencies into global climate politics, which resulted in diversified, often 
bilateral negotiating strategies by key players such as China and the US (Belis et al., 
2015). This trend of a stronger resorting to bilateral exchanges in the climate context 
reflects the generally rising importance of bilateralism in global politics. It has been 
particularly pronounced in global trade politics, where a plethora of regional and 
bilateral agreements were forged despite the multilateral negotiations in the World 
Trade Organization (see, e.g., Heydon & Woolcock, 2009). In the climate realm, the 
reliance on bilateralism is however not only more recent, but also serves – together 
with the abovementioned minilateral fora – an openly acknowledged preparatory 
purpose for forging progress at the multilateral level.  
 
This phenomenon is captured by the notion of ‘multiple bilateralism’, a strategy of 
‘two-way’ bilateralism characterized by: (i) one actor engaging with another actor in 
a genuine exchange on a matter; and, in this exchange, giving due attention to (ii) 
the bilateral relations each of the two entertain with one or more other players on that 
same matter, and to (iii) the broader multilateral context within which that matter is 
negotiated. This engagement, and the exchange that it involves, can take two forms: 
it can be cooperative and thus “aimed at building trust and identifying common 
landing zones in multilateral negotiations on a given issue”, or it can be confrontational 
when an actor directly challenges its interlocutor, for instance to overcome this latter’s 
obstructionist behaviour in multilateral negotiations (Belis et al., 2018: 86).  
 
Cooperative and confrontational MB are not mutually exclusive. When combining 
them, MB takes the form of ‘strategic hedging’. Strategic hedging represents a “risk 
management strategy” in complex international negotiation settings that allows for 
more effectively dealing with “risks associated with particular alignment choices vis-à-
vis one or more major powers” (Haacke, 2019: 381, 378). Relying on a mix of 
“cooperative” engagement and “confrontational elements” (Ciorciari & Haacke, 
2019: 367), strategic hedging is motivated by uncertainty about a negotiation (or crisis) 
context and other actors’ behaviour in it as well as by the general “structural incentives 
associated with the current [multi]polarity of the international system” (Tessman, 2012: 
192). In unclear contexts, hedging limits risks by offering an actor the “strategic 
flexibility” it needs to effectively pursue its objectives (Liff, 2019: 460).  
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As a foreign policy strategy, MB stands in stark contrast to the alternative strategies of 
unilateralism, ‘one-way’ bilateralism or multilateralism (Belis et al., 2018, 2015). The 
distinction between these four forms of strategic foreign policy action can be made 
along three axes (see Table 1). First, they can be distinguished in function of their 
targets: an actor’s strategy can be targeted at no other actor in particular 
(unilateralism), one other at a time (bilateralism), several others in parallel (MB), or 
many others simultaneously (multilateralism as “an institutional form which coordinates 
relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of 
conduct” (Ruggie, 1993: 11)).  
 
Second, the four forms can be differentiated further by drawing on the definition of a 
foreign policy strategy as being about “applying ends, ways and means in the 
strategic environment” (Yarger, 2006: 65). Ends refer to objectives, relying on interests 
and values; ways to the ‘how’ of attaining these objectives.2 An actor has thus 
attained its objectives when it realizes its own policies, interests and values... 
• ... as such, without having to convince or compromise with any other actor 
(unilateralism); 
• ... by having another actor take them over (one-way bilateralism); 
• ... by having them reflected in a multilateral outcome even if they diverge from 
key bilateral interlocutors’ objectives, interests and values (confrontational MB);  
• ... by having them reflected in a multilateral outcome as a result of bilateral 
exchanges establishing common ground with key interlocutors’ objectives, 
interests and values (cooperative MB); or  
• ... by having them reflected in a multilateral outcome through compromise-
seeking with many others’ objectives, interests and values at the same time 
(multilateralism).  
 
Third, the ways of attaining these objectives can then be:  
• acting one-sidedly and without consideration for others (unilateralism);  
• acting vis-à-vis another player based on one’s own objectives only (‘talking at’ 
one’s interlocutor, one-way bilateralism);  
• acting vis-à-vis multiple others in parallel while assertively pursuing one’s own 
objectives (confrontational MB);  
• acting vis-à-vis multiple others in parallel in search of common grounds that 
take account of these others’ objectives (cooperative MB); or  





2 Means refer to the resources that the ‘ways’ are based on. Since these resources are largely similar for 
the different strategic forms of interaction, they are not further considered here. 
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Table 1: Forms of strategic action in international negotiation contexts 
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Based on this classification, the paper traces the EU’s engagement – as the third 
largest global emitter – with the three major powers and contemporary no. 1, 2 and 4 
global emitters – China, the US, and India – for each of the periods 2005-2009, 2010-
2015 and 2016-2020. This is done by discussing how the EU interacts with them in terms 
of its objectives and ways. Given the main interest of this paper in the assumed 
reinforcement of bilateral relationships between key emitters, it focuses on the three 
forms of action located in the table’s shaded area in the middle of the spectrum, 
excluding unilateralism and multilateralism. This will allow for “flexible pattern-
matching”, that is, the comparison between the predicted patterns embodied in the 
different forms of bilateralism and the observed empirical patterns (Bouncken et al., 
2021: 259). Such pattern-matching requires establishing the degree of match between 
the three theorized form(s) of strategic action and the EU’s activities in each period 
and vis-à-vis each of the selected actors. The findings are presented in a “narrative” 
fashion, presenting plausible accounts of the correspondence between the “ideal 
types” of EU strategic engagement and the empirical evidence (ibid.). Subsequently, 




The detected pattern of a strategic turn in the first half of the 2010s can be explained 
with the help of a framework that pays attention to “the interplay between structural 
features at two levels of analysis – the global and the EU level – and relevant [intra-EU] 
agency” (Schunz & Damro, 2020: 125). Originally developed for explaining why EU 
external action emerges in the first place, the framework can usefully be applied to 
explaining why this external action changes over time (Gerards et al., 2021: 15). It 
combines a widely used conceptualization of EU ‘actorness’ (relying on ‘opportunity’, 
‘presence’ and ‘capability’, see Bretherton & Vogler, 2006) with a focus on agents’ 
‘entrepreneurship’ derived from public policy analysis (Kingdon, 1995) to operate with 
three key concepts: opportunity, presence and EU policy entrepreneurs. Opportunity 
“denotes factors in the external environment of ideas and events” including 
“constellations of ideas and interests held by relevant actors in the global arena as 
well as singular events” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 24; Schunz et al., 2018: 17). 
Presence refers to the EU’s identity, expressed in its legal and policy acquis (Bretherton 
& Vogler, 2006: 24; Schunz & Damro, 2020: 130). It is assumed here that a window for 
policy change opens when either the opportunity or the EU’s presence change 
significantly, or if both change in ways that lead to a considerable discrepancy 
between the global context and the EU’s identity, necessitating an adaptation of its 
external policy in the eyes of EU policy entrepreneurs. This could, for instance, be the 
case when a major health crisis like Covid-19 corresponds to a sudden nationalization 
trend in EU health policies. The window is likely to result in policy change if it is 
successfully exploited by relevant EU policy entrepreneurs. These are ‘advocates who 
are willing to invest their resource – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a 
position in return for future gain in the form of material…or solidary benefits’ (Kingdon, 
1995: 179), that is, driven by ideational or interest-related motivations (Schunz & Damro, 
2020: 130). For the health crisis example, this might imply agents mobilising to reinforce 
the EU’s external health policy in order to react to the global crisis more adequately.  
 
The narrative analysis draws on the available secondary literature, particularly for the 
first two time periods, and a triangulation of three research techniques: document 
analysis of primary sources especially from the EU, China, the US and India, several 
semi-structured interviews and numerous informal exchanges with EU and non-EU 
climate diplomats and observers of global climate negotiations during the three time 
periods, as well as participant observation of global climate negotiations during the 
2005-2009 and 2010-2015 periods. 
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The EU’s engagement with major emitters in the run-up to and at COP 15 (2005-2009): 
one-way bilateralism on the way to the Copenhagen Accord 
 
In the run-up to the 2009 Copenhagen summit, the EU’s overarching aim was primarily 
to promote its own, ideal vision of the global climate regime, limiting global 
temperature increase to no more than 2°C (Schunz, 2014: 168-169). This vision entailed 
sealing an international package deal setting emissions reduction targets – also for 
major emerging countries like China and India, from which the EU expected a 
deviation from business-as-usual emission trajectories of 15-30 percent – embedded 
into an enforceable, multilateral rule-based structure (‘top-down governance’) (ibid.). 
For this, the EU’s domestic climate regime, with its emissions trading system (ETS) and 
an effort-sharing agreement among member states, was to serve as a model.  
 
The EU’s approach vis-à-vis China: one-way bilateralism 
 
The EU had started to engage with China bilaterally as of the early 2000s, in reaction 
to rapid Chinese economic growth and rising GHG emissions (Belis & Schunz, 2013). A 
first bilateral agreement was reached with the 2005 ‘China-EU Partnership on Climate 
Change’. It mostly concentrated on practical-technical cooperation projects, 
including the creation of a ‘Europe-China Clean Energy Centre’ in Beijing and an ‘EU-
China CDM Facilitation Project’, both financially supported by the EU (ibid.; Interview 
1). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) quickly became a rather significant 
bilateral cooperation focus, too, with China turning into the largest source of supply of 
tradeable emission credits, and the EU’s ETS the largest source of demand during 
much of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-2012).3  
 
With this focus on hands-on, incentives-based cooperation with China during the pre-
COP 15 period, the EU managed to establish project-focused climate relations in areas 
it had identified as important. Although it tried, the EU was less successful, however, 
when it came to linking this to discussions about global climate negotiations and thus 
convincing China of the merits of its above positions regarding the future climate 
regime (Belis & Schunz, 2013: 194). Despite continuous dialogues in the context of the 
annual EU-China summits and under the 2005 Partnership framework, China was not 
willing to commit to binding emission reduction targets. In 2009, it announced a 
voluntary national target of a 40-45 percent reduction of carbon intensity by 2020 
compared to 2005 levels. At COP 15, China closely aligned with India’s confrontational 
stance, discussed below, and insisted on a differentiation between developed and 
developing country targets. This and the converging positions between the BASIC 
 
3 Due to environmental integrity and over-allocation concerns, the EU largely banned credit imports into 
the ETS after 2013. 
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countries and the US regarding the ‘bottom-up’ nature of the future climate regime, 
also discussed below, strongly contributed to the failure of reaching agreement in 2009 
(Van Schaik & Schunz, 2012). 
 
The Union’s emphasis on practical bilateral cooperation with China, with only limited 
consideration for the overall multilateral negotiation context and other key emitters’ 
positions, provide strong indications of a strategy through which it predominantly 
‘talked at’ its Chinese interlocutors, leading to a relationship that had not yet “reached 
a sufficient level of maturity” for cooperation in the UN regime (Belis & Schunz, 2013: 
195). During the period 2005-2009, the pattern of EU climate diplomacy vis-à-vis China 
comes thus closest to ‘one-way bilateralism’. 
 
The EU’s approach vis-à-vis the United States: one-way bilateralism 
 
Whereas the US – as the long-standing no. 1 global emitter – had traditionally been the 
main target of EU external climate action, during George W. Bush’s first presidency 
(2001-2005) EU-US climate relations had largely been characterized by mutual neglect. 
It was only during his second term and following the release of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s rather alarming 2006/2007 Fourth Assessment Report that 
EU-US climate and – especially – energy relations were gradually re-established. In 2005 
and 2007, EU-led attempts at re-engaging the US in global climate negotiations were 
made in the framework of the G-7 (Afionis, 2011). In 2005, the UK held the G-7 and the 
EU Council Presidencies and used the G-7 summit in Gleneagles to commit the Bush 
administration to discussions on climate change. Two years later, when Germany held 
the G-7 and the EU Council Presidencies, Chancellor Merkel convinced Bush at the G-
7 summit at Heiligendamm to acknowledge climate change as ‘one of the major 
challenges for mankind’ (G-7, 2007). While EU leaders thus successfully pushed the US 
in minilateral fora to re-engage in multilateral discussions on a reform of the UN climate 
regime kicked off at the Bali COP 13 in late 2007, the bilateral relations per se remained 
embryonic during the remainder of the Bush Presidency.  
 
This changed considerably once the Obama administration took office in early 2009. 
Hopes were high in the EU that US climate policies would become more aligned with 
the EU’s model. In 2009, the EU’s transatlantic climate diplomacy was therefore also 
considerably stepped up. Numerous climate advisors were dispatched into the 
Commission Delegation and EU member state embassies in Washington, D.C., resulting 
in diverse outreach activities to the US executive and legislative branches, but also to 
US states and civil society (Interviews 2, 3). Moreover, a plethora of exchanges at both 
negotiator and highest political levels ensued. Exchanges were institutionalized in the 
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US-EU Energy Council, created in 2009 and meeting annually to discuss issues of joint 
interest related to energy security and climate change (Schunz, 2014: 177).  
 
In all these contexts, the EU attempted to influence a US debate that was volatile after 
eight years of federal-level inactivity under Bush. While the Obama administration and 
Congress were still debating ways of regulating climate change domestically, 
including the possibility of introducing cap-and-trade legislation, and defining the US 
climate diplomacy strategy, the EU tried to convey its key messages in favour of more 
ambitious climate policies based on its 2008/2009 climate and energy package. In 
particular, EU representatives tried to convince their US interlocutors of the merits of 
the Union’s ETS, which they portrayed as an example for the US to follow and as the 
nucleus of a future global carbon market (Interviews 2, 3).  
 
Altogether, EU activities vis-à-vis the US in the run-up to COP 15 can best be 
characterized as a form of ‘one-way bilateralism’, that is, a strategy that was centered 
on its own climate regime and objectives. Given the yet uncertain US positions, the 
Union was essentially ‘talking at’ the Americans, trying to convince them to follow its 
model. This attempt at persuasion could, unlike in the cases of China and India, not 
rely on positive incentives in the form of projects aimed at capacity-building, for 
instance, but involved offers of sharing EU know-how. The period was also 
characterized by little attention for, and indeed an insufficient understanding of, US 
concerns regarding, for instance, the legal form of the outcome of COP 15. The Union 
went into the endgame of the post-2012 negotiations with the unfounded hope that 
the Obama administration would have a larger margin of maneuver, both in terms of 
the legal outcome and of the US emissions reduction target. Both assumptions proved 
faulty when the US sided with the BASIC at COP 15, sidelining the EU (Van Schaik & 
Schunz, 2012). 
 
The EU’s approach vis-à-vis India: one-way bilateralism 
 
The EU’s climate diplomacy regarding India was very similar to the engagement 
strategy it adopted vis-à-vis China during the period 2005-2009, albeit even less 
successful. In 2005, the EU attempted to launch an initiative with India based on the 
same draft text it had used for the 2005 ‘China-EU Programme on Climate Change’. 
The final version of the ‘India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate 
Change’, however, “was significantly less substantive, because of significant 
resistance by the Indian government” (Torney, 2015b: 115).  
 
The results of operating with such a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in its climate diplomacy 
vis-à-vis the major emerging countries remained, also in the case of India, very limited 
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during this period despite both bilateral collaboration and cooperation in the 
multilateral climate regime (Schunz, 2014). Many of the EU’s specific objectives were 
diametrically opposed to those of India. India framed climate change strongly in terms 
of equity and the relevance of per capita emissions, historical responsibilities, 
differentiation, climate finance, technology transfer to developing countries and the 
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, including the ‘firewall’ between developed (or 
Annex I) and developing (or non-Annex I) countries. The EU, by contrast, based on its 
abovementioned positions, aimed at removing the firewall and bringing the emerging 
economies under a common UN-based framework, paying much less attention to 
equity concerns or per capita emissions. This led to a strong disconnect throughout this 
period between the two parties, culminating in the opposition between the BASIC 
group and the EU at COP 15, with some observers branding India as a key “spoiler” of 
that conference (Belis et al, 2018: 89). 
 
In sum, in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit, the EU largely failed to engage India 
in any meaningful way, either at a practical level (as it managed to do with China) or 
at the foreign policy level to advance the multilateral negotiations. There is little 
evidence that the EU took India’s objectives, or its own parallel relations with other key 
players, into account when engaging with the Indians. Like for China and the US, the 
form of the EU’s interaction with India can therefore most adequately be 
characterized as ‘one-way bilateralism’. 
 
The EU’s engagement with major emitters in the run-up to and at COP 21 (2010-2015): 
strategic hedging and co-leadership on the way to the Paris Agreement 
 
COP 15 considerably changed global climate politics and brought to the fore that 
China and the US now constituted the two dominant actors, in terms of both GHG 
emissions and geopolitical clout. It also demonstrated that a top-down governance 
approach, as desired by the EU, was not a viable option in global climate politics. No 
other major emitter was prepared to allow a sovereignty transgression by committing 
to internationally legally binding targets. As a result, the EU adapted its positions for the 
multilateral context (Schunz, 2019): while still pursuing the ambition of a legally binding 
outcome, it adopted a less ambitious target and became more flexible in is 
expectations of other parties, from whom it expected “fair and ambitious” “intended 
nationally determined contributions” (Council of the EU, 2015: point 7).  
 
The EU’s approach vis-à-vis China: primarily cooperative multiple bilateralism 
 
The EU’s approach towards China represents the most telling example of how the 
Union’s diplomatic approach changed during the negotiations on the Paris 
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Agreement. Rather than pursuing its previous ‘leadership-by-example’ approach, the 
Union acted upon a better understanding of China’s historical sensitivities regarding 
national sovereignty, resulting from closer diplomatic ties (Interview 4). While the 
likelihood that the country would accept GHG reduction targets set internationally 
was considered very low, its willingness to adhere to a trust-based, bottom-up regime 
was judged to be high by the Union’s negotiators. This realization contributed to a 
loosening of the EU’s earlier rigid demands, resulting in the abovementioned, more 
flexible objectives regarding the global climate regime (ibid.). 
 
The better understanding of China’s position implied an insight into the main causes 
of the country’s increasingly more cooperative stance on climate change. They were 
both domestic and international. As argued by Hilton & Kerr (2016), China’s domestic 
economic restructuring, with lower levels of growth and a gradual turn from heavy 
industry to a service- and consumption-led economy, provided room for the Chinese 
leadership to commit to more significant targets. At the same time, the leadership 
transition also represented a significant cause of change, with the new President Xi 
Jinping showing much greater ambition to play a leading role in global climate politics 
than his predecessors (Belis et al., 2018). There was also a strong desire to correct the 
image created of China as one of the actors (together with India) that had prevented 
a meaningful outcome at COP 15. 
  
In line with its greater willingness to engage globally on climate change, China sought 
to reinforce its ties with the other big emitter, the US, before COP 21. Following months 
of diplomatic exchanges, Xi and Obama revealed, in November 2014, a high-level 
agreement that saw China pledge “to achieve the peaking of CO2 emissions around 
2030 and … to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 
around 20% by 2030” in return for US GHG emissions cuts of 26-28 percent below their 
2005 level by 2025 (White House, 2014). The two leaders also confirmed their interest in 
a bottom-up regime with reinforced ambition over time.  
 
The increasing centrality of the China-US relationship in global negotiations also 
illustrated China’s embrace of a strategy of MB in the climate context. Besides the US, 
China also approached other countries, especially India, in the run-up to the Paris 
summit. Regarding the EU, the engagement was mutual, based on a joint interest in 
reinforced bilateral ties. Building on the 2005 China-EU Partnership on Climate Change, 
bilateral talks were bolstered during the period 2010-2015, culminating in several 
substantial cooperation projects, notably regarding capacity-building on emissions 
trading and green urbanization, both officially launched in 2012 (Schunz & Belis, 2015). 
All these projects were more closely linked to dialogues aimed at developing a 
common understanding of the options for forging a global climate deal at COP 21. 
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The EU’s understanding of China’s position and of how it could engage the country in 
a meaningful way in the climate regime was immensely helped by the US-China deal. 
When China issued its intended nationally determined contribution during Xi’s visit to 
Europe in June 2015, it also outlined details of its domestic targets and its view of a 
possible Paris outcome. The country aimed at a “legally binding agreement”, with the 
“nationally determined contributions by developed and developing countries … listed 
respectively and separately in the Paris outcome” (NDRC, 2015). It simultaneously 
emphasized that transparency for developing countries should be enforced in a way 
that is “non-intrusive, non-punitive and respecting national sovereignty” (ibid.). This text 
signaled to the EU the existence of a workable landing zone: while developing 
countries could continue to be treated ‘with more flexibility’ compared to developed 
countries, the EU would be able to obtain China’s (and other emerging/developing 
countries’) commitment to a solid, albeit self-set target.  
 
In sum, the EU’s climate diplomacy vis-à-vis China was characterized to a much larger 
extent than before by pursuing not just its own objectives, but rather seeking to find 
possible ways of reconciling its positions with those of China. Incentives-based 
measures and dialogues were employed to this end, and the EU took greater account 
of the positions of other BASIC countries and the US in its relations with China. The EU 
thus employed primarily a strategy of ‘cooperative multiple bilateralism’, with a slight 
confrontational edge when it opposed – together with its High Ambition Coalition 
partners – the BASIC group’s position on differentiation at COP 21, as discussed below. 
 
The EU’s approach vis-à-vis the United States: cooperative multiple bilateralism 
 
Immediately after COP 15, the climate relations between the EU and the US cooled 
down considerably. In 2010, the US initially intended to dislocate global climate talks 
from the UN regime into smaller fora, a strategy already pursued by the Bush 
administration and revived by Obama with the sponsoring of the Major Economies 
Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF).4 This attempt was successfully resisted 
by a large group of parties attached to multilateralism, including the EU alongside the 
emerging and developing countries. The US then employed the MEF to pre-discuss 
deals that were later formalized in the UN negotiations. Domestically, the ‘American 
Clean Energy and Security Act’, which had been approved by the House of 
Representatives in June 2009, was – due to Republican resistance – never discussed in 
the Senate. This marked the ultimate failure of Obama’s plans for a comprehensive 
national climate legislation (Schunz, 2016).  
 
 
4 This Forum, which met each year between 2009 and 2015, brought together 17 major economies: 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, South Africa, the UK, and the US. 
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Given the domestic policy stalemates in the US, the EU partially turned its attention 
away from the United States and towards a stronger – bilateral – engagement with 
the emerging economies. It also invested into coalition-building with vulnerable and 
developing countries in the so-called “progressive alliance” (Van Schaik, 2013), later 
turned into the ‘High Ambition Coalition’5 at Paris. An effort at engaging in 
unilateralism with the inclusion of non-EU air carriers into the Union’s emissions trading 
system backfired, however (Birchfield, 2015). This move aimed at gaining leverage 
over unregulated international airline emissions provoked hostile reactions in the US, 
leading Congress to pass a bill forbidding US companies to comply with EU legislation. 
EU-US climate relations were thus not at their best when the start of new climate regime 
reform negotiations was decided upon at the Durban COP 17 in late 2011.  
 
In the period that followed, EU-US climate relations improved again, especially when 
Obama began his second term in office with reinvigorated climate activism. The 
milestones of US climate policy were Obama’s decision to empower the 
Environmental Protection Agency on the regulation of emissions and, in August 2015, 
the adoption of the ‘Clean Power Plan’, which foresaw GHG reductions in the power 
sector of 32 percent from 2005 levels by 2030 (EPA, 2015). In parallel, US climate 
diplomacy was reinforced through overt ‘multiple bilateralism’, particularly via 
strengthened relations with the BASIC. The US primarily reached out to China in view 
of forging a bilateral partnership around its preferred bottom-up approach to global 
climate governance, based on (intended) ‘nationally determined contributions’ 
(NDCs) as nuclei of a global multilateral treaty. The abovementioned November 2014 
US-China agreement was the most tangible outcome of this strategic engagement.  
 
Both the US commitment to stronger domestic action and to forging a global deal 
made the EU more actively seek engagement with the Americans again in the run-up 
to COP 21. However, beyond the joint willingness to reach a meaningful deal, US-EU 
interaction in the climate negotiations was based on only “loose cooperation [and] 
frequent information exchange” (Biedenkopf & Walker, 2018: 308). This exchange did 
allow the EU to better understand the US (and by extension the US-Chinese) positions 
and attitudes, notably on the ultimate objectives of the negotiations. At the Paris 
summit, EU-US cooperation would become one crucial ingredient for the adoption of 
the final deal. To enable the Paris Agreement, “the position of the US-BASIC coalition 
around the bottom-up nature of the agreement had to be reconciled with the position 
of the EU’s ‘High Ambition Coalition’ with developing countries, which pushed firmly 
for the objective of keeping global warming below 2°C … and for a robust framework 
for reviewing future ‘nationally determined contributions’ so that these could actually 
 
5 This coalition comprised more than 100 countries: next to the EU-28 especially small-island states as well 
as other vulnerable and least developed countries.  
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allow reaching this ambition” (Schunz, 2016: 443). During the final days of COP 21, the 
US (and Brazil) asked to join the ‘High Ambition Coalition’, putting pressure on China 
and India and thus enabling the ultimate deal.   
 
In sum, during the period 2010-2015, the EU’s climate diplomacy vis-à-vis the United 
States was characterized by an attempt at addressing the US in the framework of its 
broader cooperative MB strategy. Where EU climate diplomacy had in the past often 
been overly focused on the US, it had now – while diversifying its outreach considerably 
– offered the US opportunities for cooperation with limited fervency. For both sides, the 
engagement with the other was clearly no longer at the core of their climate 
diplomacy strategies. While the US was thus a piece in the puzzle of EU’s cooperative 
multiple bilateral strategy, the Union arguably invested more into its relations with the 
BASIC, specifically China, and the High Ambition Coalition. 
   
The EU’s approach vis-à-vis India: mixed multiple bilateralism 
 
During the entire period 2010-2015, the EU’s relationship with India remained more 
strained compared to its ties with China and the US. As in the case of China, the EU 
attempted to better understand and address Indian positions after COP 15 via 
extended diplomatic outreach. While the country’s emphasis on equity, differentiation 
and ‘means of implementation’ (i.e. climate finance and technology transfer) 
remained strong, notable changes in its position occurred when the new Prime Minister 
Modi took charge of setting the diplomatic agenda on climate change. By 2015, this 
translated into several bilateral deals with the US and several EU members (including 
Germany and France) aimed at promoting clean energy. They included Modi’s own 
efforts to create an ‘International Solar Alliance’ of 120 countries, launched with 
French support at COP 21. Based on the impetus from its new leadership, India itself 
thus clearly embraced a form of multiple bilateralism, as did the EU (Belis et al., 2018). 
 
Its better understanding of the Indian positions helped the EU to accept that pushing 
the country towards top-down, binding commitments would not be successful. Yet, in 
the absence of a real Indian willingness to engage with the EU in the type of hands-on 
cooperation that the Union had developed with China, concrete areas of agreement 
were harder to identify. Despite bilateral dialogues, several contentious items 
remained, as became visible during the Durban COP and especially at the Paris 
summit (Belis et al., 2018; Van Schaik, 2013).  
 
In this context, the EU’s climate diplomacy relied on a mixed form of multiple 
bilateralism with regard to India. On the one hand, it attempted to engage the Indians 
– including via individual member states – as much as possible in dialogues linked to 
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the UN climate negotiations (Belis et al., 2018). On the other hand, and because it had 
prepared the Paris summit through multiple bilateral relations, the EU was able to 
pursue a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis India. The existence of acceptable 
landing zones between the EU and China and the other BASIC countries (Brazil and 
South Africa) on issues such as differentiation, as well as its solid anchorage in the High 
Ambition Coalition (which excluded both China and India, but eventually included 
the US and Brazil) enabled the EU to put pressure on India to compromise on issues 
related to differentiation and the level of ambition during the final days of the Paris 
summit (Schunz, 2016; Oberthür & Groen, 2018).  
 
In sum, there is thus significant evidence that the EU adopted a confrontational MB 
approach, with some cooperative elements, vis-à-vis India during this period.  
 
The EU’s engagement with major emitters after COP 21 (2016-2020): sustaining multiple 
bilateralism to implement the Paris Agreement 
 
The Paris Agreement adopted at COP 21 was widely hailed as a success of 
multilateralism, despite its nature as a “high-stakes experiment” in international law 
and in policy-making (Doelle, 2016). Its ratification was achieved in record time: the 
US-China tandem led the way, followed by the EU and India so that already in October 
2016, before the US presidential elections, the treaty could enter into force. 
Subsequently, parties engaged on two parallel negotiation tracks: one aimed at 
operationalizing key PA provisions (e.g. on the ‘ambition mechanism’, transparency 
and review) to prepare it for implementation; and a second one focussing on 
enhancing parties’ ambitions. The announcement of the newly elected President 
Trump in June 2017 to withdraw the US from the PA slowed these processes down, but 
did not halt them, thanks also to the reinvigoration of multiple bilateralism between 
the remaining major emitters.  
 
During the period 2016-2020, the EU’s multilateral objectives were unequivocal: it 
wanted to obtain, on the one hand, “a common set of rules for the implementation 
of all provisions of the Agreement in a balanced and tailored manner, applicable to 
all Parties while addressing Parties’ different starting points and evolving capacities” 
(Council of the EU, 2018: point 19) and, on the other hand, high levels of ambition, 
calling on parties to “step up the global efforts to tackle climate change in light of the 
latest available science” (Council of the EU, 2019: point 11). The EU undertook this latter 
step in 2019-2020 when announcing the European Green Deal and updating its 
‘nationally determined contribution’ from 40 to 55 percent GHG reductions from 1990 




The EU’s approach vis-à-vis China: cooperative multiple bilateralism  
 
Ever since the Paris summit, the EU and China have been on rather solidly good terms 
regarding climate change. Despite numerous frictions in a general bilateral 
relationship that saw the European External Action Service (EEAS) (2019: 1) 
characterize China as “simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation [and] 
negotiating partner ..., an economic competitor ..., and a systemic rival”, the climate 
domain has continuously remained an area of cooperation.  
 
The EU has chosen to pursue a cooperative approach on climate change with China 
to encourage positive domestic developments in light of the country’s steadily 
growing emissions. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has adopted more ambitious 
climate policies in its successive Five-Year Plans, while undertaking major investments 
in renewable energy technologies that could make it durably surpass the EU and the 
US as the planet’s no. 1 clean tech nation (Holzmann & Grünberg, 2021). In late 2020, 
China also committed to reaching net-zero emissions by 2060, a target that the EU’s 
High Representative Borrell qualified as “a tipping point in the fight against climate 
change”, “provided acts follow words” (EEAS, 2020). At the same time, the country still 
faces the challenges of sustaining its growth and meeting continuously increasing 
energy demands while phasing out its fossil fuel consumption – a monumental defy 
the EU acknowledges and wishes to help tackling. 
 
The solidity of the partnership manifested itself particularly after Trump announced the 
US withdrawal from the PA. At that point, China and the EU did not only individually 
reinforce their commitment to the multilateral regime, but also actively undertook to 
reinforce multiple bilateralism with each other and key third parties, including the other 
BASIC countries and Canada (Yan, 2020: 161-162). On the one hand, this became 
visible via reinforced direct ties, which culminated, in 2018, in a remarkably strongly 
worded ‘EU-China Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy’ (EU-
China, 2018). Initially planned for 2017, when it failed over disagreements regarding 
China’s ‘market economy’ status, the statement underlined that the “EU and China 
consider climate action and the clean energy transition an imperative more important 
than ever” (ibid.: 1). It was accompanied by a novel cooperation impetus, notably in 
areas such as emissions trading and low-carbon cities cooperation (Yan, 2020). 
 
On the other hand, EU-China cooperation took the form of explicitly ‘triangulating’ 
bilateral relations by including the US’ neighbour, Canada (under the climate-
progressive Trudeau government), into the exchanges. Since September 2017, and in 
preparation of UN climate meetings, the EU, China, and Canada have met annually 
in a format known as the ‘Ministerial on Climate Action’ (MoCA) (European 
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Commission, 2021). Under their co-leadership, the MoCA was gradually extended to 
the participation of other major emitters. In the absence of US leadership, it filled an 
important void, notably when it came to reaffirming climate commitments during the 
Covid-19 crisis (Simon, 2020). 
 
Altogether, the post-Paris pattern of EU engagement with China, notably during the 
Trump Presidency, was unequivocally one of cooperative bilateralism that became 
cooperative MB via its efforts to extend the bilateral relations to Canada and to co-
lead global negotiations on the operationalization and implementation of the PA. This 
yielded positive outcomes, most importantly by contributing to the adoption of a 
rulebook operationalizing the Paris Agreement at the 2018 COP 24 Katowice.  
 
The EU’s approach vis-à-vis the US: from one-way bilateralism to multi-level 
cooperative MB 
 
The story of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis the US in the post-COP 21 period can be quickly 
told: the transatlantic channels of communication came to an abrupt halt when 
climate denier Trump moved into the White House. His agenda foresaw a complete 
roll-back of Obama’s climate policies, renewed investments into the fossil fuel industry, 
as well as a disengagement from the global climate regime, which was quickly 
confirmed with Trump’s announcement of withdrawing the US from the PA (Steinhauer, 
2018). Added to this were an open hostility towards the EU and its integration process.  
 
Where EU policy-makers had initially looked for ways to nonetheless constructively 
engage with the Trump administration, for instance by gradually reviving dialogue in 
the US-EU Energy Council (ibid.: 22), these attempts soon proved ineffective. As a 
result, EU-US bilateral climate relations at the governmental level were essentially 
suspended for the remainder of Trump’s presidency. Instead, the EU increasingly 
engaged with US sub-national – state and city governments – as well as civil society 
actors, for instance through EU-California cooperation and the Global Covenant of 
Mayors (Biedenkopf & Walker, 2018). This engagement included informal exchanges 
in the context of global climate regime negotiations. 
 
Despite an EU climate diplomacy strategy vis-à-vis the US that could initially best be 
understood as (futile) one-way bilateralism, the emerging pattern of engagement with 
US sub-national and other players points to a form of cooperative MB at different 
levels. This multi-level cooperative MB has not yet been borne fruit at the multilateral 
level but may provide the fertile ground for re-building EU-US bilateral climate relations, 




The EU’s approach vis-à-vis India: towards primarily cooperative multiple bilateralism 
 
The EU’s approach towards India and their multiple bilateral relationship developed in 
the run-up to the Paris summit has since remained rather stable. The prospects of a US 
PA withdrawal could have provoked a change in 2017, but in the light of further 
Chinese engagement, reinforced EU-China climate links, but also domestic 
developments in India, the Indian commitment to solid climate relations with the EU 
(and the BASIC) endured. 
 
The pragmatic path global climate negotiations pursued with the Paris Agreement has 
– together with domestic factors – contributed to a change of attitude towards 
climate change in India: where the topic “was considered an exclusively diplomatic 
... issue” until the early 2010s, “now, there is a slew of policy and institutional activity 
[with] [n]ational and sub-national levels of government ... internalizing climate change 
..., as well as building linkages across climate and non-climate actions” (Dubash & 
Ghosh, 2019: 345). A major indicator of India’s commitment is its nationally determined 
contribution, which comes with unconditional (an emissions intensity of 33-35 percent 
below 2005 levels) and conditional (a non-fossil fuel share of power generation 
capacity of 40 percent, depending on external support) 2030 targets (CAT, 2020). Of 
the major emitters, India was, in 2020, the only one on a below 2°C global warming 
trajectory (ibid.). The Indian government was also quick to underscore its commitment 
to the PA following Trump’s withdrawal announcement. 
 
Not surprisingly, the EU sought to continue engaging India around climate change 
after Paris. In 2016, the two sides concluded a new ‘EU-India Clean Energy and Climate 
Partnership’, which has since contributed to reinforced policy dialogue as well as 
numerous cooperation projects on renewables, notably solar energy, energy 
efficiency and bi- and multilateral climate action (EU Delegation to India, 2020). The 
partnership was further strengthened at the 2020 EU-India summit with the ‘EU-India 
Strategic Partnership – Roadmap for 2025’, in which the two parties vow to collaborate 
closely around the PA implementation (EU-India, 2020: 3-4). Despite occasional 
frictions in climate negotiations regarding the differentiation between developed and 
developing countries, the EU and India have thus found ways to use their bilateral 
cooperation for fruitful engagement in the context of the multilateral climate 
negotiations. 
 
Altogether, EU-India climate relations have thus further improved, leaning more 
towards cooperative than confrontational MB in recent years. 
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Comparing the EU’s climate diplomacy strategies across major emitters and time 
 
The findings for the EU’s engagement with major emitters during the three examined 
periods allow for a comparison that clearly shows a strategic turn in the Union’s climate 
diplomacy (see Table 2). 
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One-way bilateralism Mixed – confrontational 




Cross-actor pattern One-way bilateralism Strategic hedging Cooperative multiple bilateralism 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
During the period 2005-2009, the EU invested, for the first time, into its bilateral climate 
relations with China and India, while attempting to reinforce its relations with the US, 
especially since the start of the Obama Presidency. Each of these bilateral relations 
took the form of ‘one-way bilateralism’. In the case of the US, the EU used its internal 
climate regime, based on policies adopted with the 2008/2009 climate and energy 
package, and especially its ETS, as a model for the Americans to follow – in vain, as 
the failed attempt at passing cap-and-trade legislation in Congress illustrated. 
Regarding China and India, the EU forged bilateral relationships relying to a larger 
extent on a combination of showcasing its model and positive incentives to have them 
adopt EU-like policies: it offered capacity-building, technology transfer and other 
forms of support in return for climate dialogues and (ideally) cooperation in the 
multilateral arena. This led however to limited successes: in the Chinese case, it resulted 
in the selective adoption of EU policies and strong cooperation around the CDM; in 
the Indian case, the EU encountered above all resistance (Torney, 2015a). Altogether, 
during this period, the EU’s climate diplomacy approach amounted thus to a peculiar 
mix of one-way bilateralism with the three major emitters, paired with a quite 
principled, rigid approach to the multilateral negotiations aimed at creating a 
maximum of global predictability in line with its own values related to multilateralism, 
the development of international law and precaution. Neither individually regarding 
the three players, nor at the multilateral level did this self-referential approach allow 




After COP 15, the EU’s relations with the three major emitters gradually changed, as 
the EU engaged in forms of two-way bilateralism that were explicitly linked to the 
multilateral arena. This strategy was most apparent in the EU’s dealings with China and 
(to a lesser extent) the US in the form of cooperative MB, but also detectable in its 
interactions with India, where it took a mixed, confrontational-cooperative form. It was 
coupled with an overall change of attitude. The EU now pursued objectives that were 
no longer purely centred on its internal climate regime and defined in function of its 
own ideal outcome of a top-down governance nature. Instead, it sought to develop 
a better understanding of the global context including others’ positions, interests and 
values. In so doing, it started to reflect more strategically on how to approach these 
other players in parallel, showing a greater understanding for the complexity of global 
climate politics. Importantly, it reasoned in terms of a multilateral outcome achievable 
for all major emitters, as well as about the concessions it would take to forge such an 
outcome. Part of this exercise was an active reflection on how to counterbalance – 
via strategic coalition-building – the power of these other players. It was then also 
during this period that the EU deployed both cooperative and confrontational forms 
of MB and was thus most obviously – and successfully – using ‘strategic hedging’ to 
deal with a very complex, multipolar negotiation context. This particularly served the 
purpose of countering the power of the BASIC group (especially India) and its 
resistance on certain negotiation items (e.g. differentiation) while still cooperating with 
them on others. In sum, during the period 2010-2015, the EU’s approach thus changed 
from wanting to create a maximum degree of predictability of the global context to 
wanting to create a ‘conducive environment’ for global climate action, in which 
further EU ambitions could be pursued in the medium to long term.  
 
The continuation of this approach – especially a further pursuit of cooperative MB – 
could be regarded as a fundamental ingredient for the successful implementation of 
the Paris Agreement. Yet, during the period 2016-2020, the global context remained 
rather dynamic, with repercussions for the EU’s climate diplomacy. The hostility of the 
Trump administration to climate action, multilateralism and the EU per se, implied that 
MB vis-à-vis the US government – even of the confrontational sort – was no longer an 
option. This would have presupposed open channels of communication, which were 
not given. Instead, the EU creatively pursued a path it had already taken during the 
George W. Bush Presidency, namely that of engaging with sub-federal level actors at 
state and municipal, but also non-governmental levels in what could be considered 
as a form of multi-level cooperative MB, preparing the ground for the post-Trump era. 
With China and India, trends of the pre-Paris period were reinforced, without however 
taking the confrontational form the EU had resorted to at Paris. This yielded some 
success when, at COP 24 in Katowice, the Paris Agreement rulebook was adopted. 
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In synthesis, the longitudinal analysis of the EU’s climate diplomatic strategy clearly 
reveals a strategic turn in the early 2010s. The EU’s strategy evolved from a self-centred, 
one-way bilateralism that did not duly consider its partners’ positions and interests and 
values, to forms of MB that – at Paris – were of both the cooperative and 
confrontational type, amounting thus to a form of ‘strategic hedging’. This made sense 
in an uncertain, complex and volatile context where pressure for an outcome was 
high, but the positions of the EU and the BASIC on key agenda items diverged. In the 
period that followed, the pattern stabilized regarding China and India, in the latter 
case with a penchant towards greater cooperative MB. It changed vis-à-vis the US 
due to Trump’s climate denialism. This does not call into question the overarching 
pattern, however. From a counterfactual perspective, a Hillary Clinton presidency that 
would have continued Obama’s climate diplomacy would most certainly have led to 
continued EU-US cooperative MB. The multi-level cooperative MB the EU tried to 
develop during the Trump years form the basis for an effective re-engagement with 
the US under Biden, taking due account of the current state of the bilateral relations 
with its other key partners and of the significantly evolved multilateral context. 
 
The next section offers an explanation of the patterns detected.  
 
Explaining the EU’s strategic turn to multiple bilateralism 
 
The strategic turn in EU climate diplomacy comprises two aspects requiring 
explanation: first, a shift from a principled ‘leadership-by-example’ approach relying 
on ‘one-way bilateralism’ to a more flexible strategy of ‘hedging’ through cooperative 
and confrontational MB; and second, the slight variation in approach vis-à-vis different 
major powers. Rather than developing a monocausal explanation of its strategic 
adjustment, which would account for EU external action with reference to, for 
instance, either its interests (Kelemen & Vogel, 2010) or its norms (Van Schaik & Schunz, 
2012), this paper adopts a multi-causal perspective focusing on the interplay between 
opportunity and presence, as well as EU agency.   
 
The policy window: a changing opportunity meets an entrenched presence 
 
The durable change of the EU’s climate diplomacy during the first half of the 2010s 
was enabled by a policy window emerging from the clash of a radically changing 
and challenging opportunity with a reinforced EU presence demanding effective 






Opportunity: changing global climate politics 
 
COP 15 represented a forceful manifestation of a major geopolitical change 
producing both complexity and uncertainty, for which neither the EU nor other major 
emitters had been adequately prepared (Belis et al., 2018). Until the mid-2000s, global 
climate politics had been strongly influenced by the major developed country 
emitters, the US, the EU and Japan. The general rise of the BASIC countries in economic 
terms as well as the important growth of these countries’ emissions during the 2000s 
durably altered this geopolitical constellation. It resulted in a multipolar setting that 
found its expression in the negotiation scenario and the minimalistic result of COP 15. 
The outcome of that summit prompted serious strategic reflections by all major 
emitters. In China, it resulted in a significant modification of the framing of climate 
change and contributed to a fundamental shift in position fuelled by a changing 
economy and a new, ambitious leadership under Xi Jinping. In the US, by contrast, the 
immediate response was an attempt to move the global climate talks out of the UN 
altogether before domestic politics stalled US climate diplomacy during the remainder 
of Obama’s first term. A more assertive US climate diplomacy – based on more reliable 
and predictable internal policies driven not by Congress, but by the Executive – 
emerged during his second term. When the US and China, based on these internal 
changes, forged their November 2014 climate deal to clear the path for agreement 
at Paris, they were engaging in a form of cooperative bilateralism. Given that they 
also sought to construe additional bilateral dialogues, knitting a dense web of 
cooperative arrangements, inter alia with the EU and India, their strategy was clearly 
one of MB. 
 
The evolving geopolitical context and other major powers’ strategic adjustments to 
this dynamic environment, fuelled by their domestic debates, provided a significantly 
altered external opportunity for the EU: suddenly it faced several major powers with 
positions diverging fundamentally from its own and strategies focussed on bilateral ties.  
 
Presence: constitutionalizing the EU’s identity as a climate guardian 
 
When it comes to the EU’s presence, its already very solid legal framework regarding 
climate change, which had been lifted to a new level of communitarization with the 
2008/2009 climate and energy package, was further reinforced with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. Article 191.1 TFEU elevates climate 
change to the rank of a quasi-constitutional objective: “Union policy on the 
environment shall contribute to … the following objectives: … promoting measures at 
international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in 
particular combating climate change”. This implies that the EU has a treaty-based 
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obligation, now even more than before, to pursue its role as a regional and global 
climate guardian through effective internal and external climate policies. 
 
Yet, it is this effectiveness that was lacking from EU climate diplomacy: given the 
altered opportunity, the EU’s ‘leadership-by-example’ strategy embodied in ‘one-way 
bilateralism’ had clearly not delivered on its desire to successfully promote “measures 
at international level to ... combat ... climate change” at COP 15. As a result, the 
objective of pursuing effective climate diplomacy ingrained in the EU’s legal acquis 
(presence) clashed with the changing geopolitics (opportunity). This discrepancy 
opened a policy window that was exploited by a coalition of long-standing and new 
policy entrepreneurs. 
 
EU agency: coalescing long-standing and new policy entrepreneurs transcend the 
‘more of the same’ approach  
  
After COP 15, the EU’s climate diplomacy initially seemed on a ‘more of the same’, 
‘leadership-by-example’ path (Schunz, 2012), before it was gradually adjusted to the 
Copenhagen experience. This adjustment resulted from the expansion of a traditional 
coalition of pro-external climate policy actors to new actors injecting foreign policy 
and strategy thinking into the EU’s climate diplomacy. 
 
Until the late 2000s, EU climate diplomacy had been prepared and implemented by 
a coalition of norm-driven policy entrepreneurs with a strong preference for a 
leadership-focussed EU climate diplomacy (Schunz, 2012). This coalition comprised 
top-level staff of the Commission’s DG Environment (later DG Climate Action) and 
officials from progressive member states meeting within the Council Working Party on 
International Environmental Issues-Climate Change (WPIEI-CC). They formed a group 
of norm entrepreneurs driven by a strong attachment to several key principles 
regarding climate change, including the necessity to strive for a high level of 
protection and to adopt a precautionary approach in the climate domain (Van 
Schaik & Schunz, 2012). Their ideas persist until the present day, and have, since the 
early 2010s, been widely supported by majorities in all relevant EU institutions: key 
member states in the Environment Council, the (relevant) Commission DGs and the 
main political groups in the European Parliament. They were also backed by important 
segments of European civil society and EU citizens, with Eurobarometer surveys 
consistently indicating that “nine in ten Europeans (90%) think that climate change is 
a very serious or a serious problem” and requesting more action (European 
Commission, 2014: 5). As a result, climate change activities were gradually reinforced, 
with the European Green Deal as the most recent example. Over time, the key 
premises of the approach defended by this group – such as that of keeping global 
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temperature increase to 2°C, and since the Paris Agreement even to 1.5°C – have 
remained stable (see also Oberthür & Groen, 2018). So had its preference for the 
‘leadership-by-example’ approach. 
 
Following the limited EU success at COP 15, this coalition came under increasing 
pressure. With reference to the flagrant ineffectiveness of the EU’s approach and to 
the policy window described above, critics within the EU questioned not so much the 
substance of its positions, but rather the ways in which its climate diplomacy had been 
deployed to defend them. Gradually, relevant EU policy-makers began to accept 
that the ‘leadership-by-example’ approach and its derivative, ‘one-way-bilateralism’, 
did not prove fit for the purpose of maintaining the EU as an influential actor in the new 
geopolitical constellation of global climate politics. 
 
The ensuing reflections on how the EU’s continuously ambitious positions could be 
defended more effectively externally were impacted by two major institutional 
novelties brought about by the Lisbon Treaty: first, Art. 218 TFEU enabled the 
Commission to externally represent the EU more widely, allowing it also to play a 
stronger role in global climate politics. This role was taken up by the Commissioner for 
‘Climate Action’, a post created (together with a Directorate-General of the same 
name) in early 2010. The first Climate Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard, immediately 
assumed a leading role in the EU’s climate troika, a move confirmed by her successor, 
Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Arias Cañete. In both cases, this also implied 
greater medium-term strategic impetus to EU climate diplomacy by the Commission. 
This trend was confirmed when Commission President von der Leyen entrusted the 
Executive Vice-President in charge of the European Green Deal (and Green Deal 
Diplomacy), Frans Timmermans, with the role as chief EU climate diplomat. 
 
Second, the Treaty provided the opportunity for the newly created High 
Representative and EEAS to become involved in EU external climate policies. While it 
would be exaggerated to claim that the HR and EEAS have had any major impact on 
the substance of EU climate diplomacy, they have been contributing to designing its 
implementation, notably via a series of climate diplomacy action plans adopted by 
the Foreign Affairs Council since 2011 (Dupont et al., 2018: 118). These have helped 
focus the EU’s attention on the evolving external context and on the strategic 
dimension of its external climate action, as well as on the ‘how’ of defending its 
positions (e.g., the most recent one: Council of the EU, 2021).  
 
In this vein, new agents reinforced the established pro-external climate action 
coalition, bringing foreign policy and strategic perspectives into the design of the EU’s 
climate diplomacy. Their insights underscored that EU climate diplomacy needed a 
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strategic change, which had to start with a greater consideration for the external 
context. This emphasis on the external opportunity then also determined to a large 
extent the specific form that the EU’s changed climate diplomatic strategy took. 
Where a ‘leadership-by-example’ approach had ultimately been entirely derived 
from internal policies (and could content itself with focusing on projecting the EU’s 
climate regime), a foreign policy perspective made EU climate diplomats understand 
that – given China’s and the US’ reliance on multiple bilateral climate strategies –, its 
weight in the multipolar climate politics depended on the capacity to better 
understand and deal with other key emitters, and thus to also play the game of MB. In 
doing so, the EU initially clearly adapted to the rules set by other major emitters, before 
– in the wake of Trump’s election – becoming a motor of continued MB. 
 
At the same time, the EU sought to remain flexible in the pursuit of its ambitious climate 
objectives via strategic hedging. Depending on the interlocutor and the degree of 
convergence or divergence with its positions, the Union was able to vary between – 
and sometimes combine – cooperative and confrontational approaches. Its objective 
has been to, as a preferred option, seek common ground where possible. Yet, to 
protect the red lines set by its norm-based positions, the EU assertively 
counterbalanced other players’ power where necessary. This necessity to adopt a 
confrontational stance emerged especially during the Paris COP when the EU 
coalesced successfully with the High Ambition Coalition to keep India and China in 
check. Strategic hedging remained an option during the Trump Presidency and will 
also do so in the future. One of the documents emanating from the reflections of 
relevant EU policy entrepreneurs, a Joint Non-Paper of the European Commission and 
the EEAS (2013: 4), unequivocally captured this idea: “The EU should invest even more 
strategically into its bilateral relations with individual partners ... to ensure convergence 
and shared leadership on climate ambition. Special attention needs to be paid 
bilaterally to the largest emitters” via “targeted strategies”. 
 
Altogether, the EU’s strategic turn resulted thus primarily from its reaction to a 
significantly transformed external context. Faced with its own ineffectiveness, a 
change in climate geopolitics, and a reinforced climate-specific presence, a 
reconstituted coalition of policy entrepreneurs initiated reflections on a readjusted EU 
climate diplomacy. These led to a mixed multiple bilateral strategy, which offered the 
possibility of hedging, to provide a better fit between the Union’s ambitions and the 





Conclusion: EU multiple bilateralism and the future of global climate politics 
 
This paper started from the observation that after the 2009 Copenhagen climate 
summit the EU has considerably modified its climate diplomatic approach, notably 
through a stronger bilateral outreach. To better understand this ‘strategic turn’, it 
undertook a comparison between the EU’s bilateral interactions with the three other 
major global emitters – China, the US and India – during the periods 2005-2009, 2010-
2015 and 2016-2020. The analysis revealed that the Union’s climate diplomacy had 
indeed transformed from a rigid and self-referential ‘leadership-by-example’ 
approach centred on ‘one-way-bilateralism’ and the promotion of top-down global 
climate governance to a mix of cooperative multiple bilateralism vis-à-vis most notably 
China, but also to some extent the US under Obama, with cooperative and 
confrontational multiple bilateralism vis-à-vis India and, at the end of COP 21, China. 
Key features of the EU’s novel strategy are greater pragmatism relying on attention to 
other players’ positions, interests and values, and a greater flexibility in its approach, 
including a willingness to accept a universal, but bottom-up UN climate regime based 
on nationally determined contributions. The multiple bilateral approach the EU 
pursued in the run-up to and at the Paris summit enabled it to co-create – together 
with the other major emitters and in cooperation with its partners from the High 
Ambition Coalition – a negotiation environment that made the Paris Agreement 
possible. In that sense, its strategic adjustment bore immediate fruit. It was, also for that 
reason, sustained during the turbulent years of the Trump Presidency.  
 
The paper offers a plausible multicausal explanation of the EU’s strategic turn which 
argues that its climate diplomacy was adapted by an ambitious coalition of long-
standing and new EU climate policy entrepreneurs that consciously reacted to a 
policy window which had opened by the changing global climate geopolitics and a 
reinforced EU presence in the climate domain. 
 
The paper’s findings have both academic and practical-political implications. 
Regarding the academic debate, the emphasis that this paper places on a foreign 
policy perspective highlighting strategic forms of interaction at the intersection 
between bilateral and multilateral arenas significantly adds to the state of the art. By 
adequately embedding the analysis of EU climate diplomacy into the novel global 
geopolitical context of (not just) the climate domain and taking due account of 
contemporary intra-EU realities, it overcomes the EU-centrism prevailing in many 
existing studies. EU-centric perspectives and a focus on its rhetoric could point to a 
desire for continuing attempts to lead by example for the purposes of fostering a 
multilateral rules-based order – an aspiration that has indeed been reinvigorated with 
the European Green Deal. However, a close inspection of EU external climate action 
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yields a more nuanced picture. It reveals that the EU’s activities de facto transcend 
by far the introspective ‘leadership-by-example’ and multilateralism-centred 
‘leadiator’ approaches: the Union chooses to invest in well-selected partnerships and 
interacts with those partners based on ever more carefully polished strategies. These 
strategies rely on a higher level of EU assertiveness. It no longer shies away from 
resorting to strategic hedging if this can help advance its positions on climate change 
(and other matters it really cares about – see, but with more scepticism regarding the 
strategic thinking behind EU hedging, Higgott & Reich, 2021: 11-13).  
 
The analysis also exposes, however, that this new strategic approach is not entirely of 
the Union’s own making: rather than setting the rules of the game, the EU has had to 
adapt to geopolitical realities shaped by others, most notably China and the US. Only 
this enabled it to remain a meaningful player – despite its relative decline in emissions 
– at all. This realization goes hand in hand with tempered ambitions: rather than the 
hybris embodied in the desire to lead the world by the example of its regional climate 
regime, EU policy-makers realized that they needed to enhance its strategic 
capacities to be able to weigh on global negotiations. Future analyses should 
therefore duly take into account that climate diplomacy is not (and never has been) 
simply the external dimension of EU internal climate action. It is thus not sufficient to 
analyse how the EU tries to explain and project internal climate policies. Rather, 
external climate policy is foreign policy unfolding in a context of complex geopolitics. 
Studies of EU climate diplomacy can thus benefit from more amply drawing on insights 
from IR theories and Foreign Policy Analysis about multipolarity and strategic 
behaviour. 
 
With the recent US re-engagement in global climate politics, all major emitters are now 
part of the global regime setting again. 2021 thus marks the real start of the PA’s 
implementation. The paper provides pointers as to how the EU should further 
approach the challenge of successfully implementing the PA in future, notably in the 
run-up to the Glasgow COP 26 aimed at enhancing parties’ GHG reduction ambitions. 
In this context, the US are forcefully trying to (re-)impose themselves as the world’s 
climate leader. President Biden’s ambitious climate agenda comes with a clear claim 
to “lead an effort to get every major country to ramp up the ambition of their domestic 
climate targets” by deploying “America’s economic leverage and power of 
example” (Biden, 2020). Biden’s campaign promises have been followed by concrete 
domestic and international action underscoring his administration’s dedication to the 
climate cause. Most notably, the Biden administration proposed a national emissions 
reduction target of 50-52 percent from 2005 levels by 2030, described as “the biggest 
climate step made by any US government in history” (CAT, 2021), alongside a 2.25 
trillion USD infrastructure and clean energy plan. Simultaneously, the US President has 
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been spearheading international climate action by organising, on 22-23 April 2021, a 
(virtual) Global Leaders Summit bringing together 40 heads of state from major 
emitting as well as vulnerable countries. The Summit had been prepared by the US 
Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, through several bilateral initiatives: 
on a visit to Brussels on 9 March, he exchanged with the College of European 
Commissioners; in Shanghai, he and his Chinese counterpart met on 15-16 April to 
conclude a widely discussed ‘U.S.-China Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis’ 
(U.S. Department of State, 2021a); with India, Kerry launched, on 22 April, the ‘U.S.-
India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership’ (U.S. Department of State, 
2021b). The US strategy of using reinforced bilateral ties to build – via the intermediary 
of a minilateral summit – towards progress in the multilateral regime clearly provides 
new momentum for the PA implementation. At the Summit, several parties (notably 
Brazil, Canada and Japan) already publicly committed to enhanced pledges. 
 
If the Union wishes to remain an effective co-leader in the climate regime, it is well-
advised to pursue a cooperative multiple bilateral strategy that responds positively to 
US’ initiatives without jeopardizing the consolidated relations built with the other major 
emitters during the Trump years. This would be consistent with the experience that, 
despite its current re-emergence as a trend-setter in global climate politics, the US has 
not been a durably reliable partner in the past. It seems therefore important for the EU 
to ensure that all major emitters continue to hold joint ownership of the PA 
implementation process. Strategic hedging therefore remains an option to enhance 
the chances of attaining the PA targets. If it becomes necessary to resort to 
confrontational MB to remind a major player of earlier pledges or of the level of 
ambition needed to reach net-zero emissions, the EU should not shy away from 
displaying the assertiveness that made its strategy successful at COP 21.  
 
Regarding the broader political debate around the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’, the 
EU’s climate diplomatic strategic turn, relying on a web of interconnected bilateral 
relations and the activation of a confrontational approach as part of its strategic 
hedging, demonstrates how a more geopolitical Union can – “in living by its laws” 
(read: autonomously) – pursue its objectives (Tocci, 2021: 8). In this vein, EU climate 
diplomacy represents a significant avant-garde area allowing the EU to further 
experiment whether the 2016 Global Strategy’s desire for (re)gaining geopolitical 
relevance despite its decreasing clout as a global player is indeed feasible and 
effective. Recent developments point to an extension of its hedging strategy to other 
policy areas, also those which do not explicitly involve the development of bilateral 
relations in the context of a multilateral negotiation setting. The most striking example 
is the simultaneous conclusion, in December 2020, of the negotiations of the ‘EU-China 
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Comprehensive Agreement on Investment’ and the offer of a comprehensive ‘New 
Transatlantic Agenda for Global Change’ to the incoming Biden administration.  
 
Lessons learned from the climate domain may help the EU to keep its relations with 
major powers in balance and to strategically maneuver through an ever more 
complex global political landscape. They include, first, a focus on the importance of 
giving comparable weight to different major partners. Second, the EU has learned that 
the parallel conduct of bilateral negotiations with a continuous awareness for their 
interconnectedness and of the intricacies of each bilateral relationship enhances the 
effectiveness of its foreign policy. This concretely entails, for instance, closer, issue-
specific cooperation between individual ‘country desks’ at the EEAS but also in 
Commission DGs dealing with particular policies (e.g. US and China divisions in DG 
Trade). Finally, a key lesson from the climate domain is that of the importance of 
assertiveness, which involves keeping the option of making issue-specific advances 
with one partner also against the will of another major partner while still maintaining 
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